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This thesis explores the events in the Soviet Union that
preceded the August 1991 coup. In addition, it will examine the
failure of the coup itself. Using a methodology of policy analysis,
two questions are investigated. The first is why did Soviet
President Mikhail Gorbachev seemingly align himself with
conservatives during the Fall and Winter of 1990-1991? Secondly,
once the conservatives were in a position to control the USSR, why
did they fail? The first question is answered by showing that
Gorbachev's movement away from reform was a pragmatic effort to
retain his power as President of the USSR. The second question is
answered by presenting evidence that reforms within the USSR had
progressed to such a point that the media and the people were able
to perform an important role in defeating the coup. The fact that the
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On the evening of 22 August 1991, Mikhail Gorbachev,
the President of the Soviet Union, held a press conference
in Moscow to answer questions about the August coup attempt
that had failed. The third question that Gorbachev was
asked dealt with the eight member Committee for the State of
Emergency (GKChP) , which had attempted the coup. The
reporter who asked the question wanted to know why Gorbachev
had put these eight men into positions of power. The
reporter pointed out that, in his opinion, "these eight
people, at the very moment that they were selected Cfor
positions of power], were obvious scoundrels." l
Gorbachev's response was simple and succinct: he stated
that he had made a mistake in appointing these men, and that
he thought he could trust them.
In fact, Gorbachev's answer was too succinct. The
question that the reporter asked is deserving of an in-depth
answer. Why did Gorbachev align himself with hard— line,
conservative communists, thereby facilitating an attempt to
overthrow him? This paper will examine this issue in an
attempt to explain what caused Gorbachev to appoint
1
right-wing conservatives to powerful positions in his reform
oriented government. The issue here is not just
appointments of conservatives, but removals and resignations
of reformers. A key time frame for significant appointments
and removals was the period of November 1990-January 1991.
This period will be examined in detail in Chapters Two and
Three in an effort to better explain Gorbachev's
self-proclaimed mistake.
Chapter Four will consider a second question: Once the
hard-line conservatives were in a position to take control
of the country, why did they fail? Both of these questions
will be answered by using a methodology of policy analysis.
The events of January 1991 in the Baltics will be examined
to show that the hard-liners had begun to take steps to
control the country. Yet the conservatives took only
limited military action, and abruptly stopped. Had the
crackdown continued in January, some say it may have been
successful. But the hard-liners hesitated, and this helped
ensure their failure.
One can say that the groundwork for the coup was first
laid when Gorbachev announced Perestroi ka and Glasnost. The
conservative, hard—line Communists saw this as an attack on
their fundamental beliefs and their privileged way of life.
Party excesses were revealed to the common Soviet citizen.
The military, KGB, and MVD were all subject to attacks in
the media. s The attacks bothered the members of the
privileged class o-F Soviet society, and led to one of the
base line motives for the coup leaders: greed and
selfishness. The men who made up the GKChP, and many more
like them, had spent their entire lives struggling to move
up the pyramid that was the Communist Party system.
Promotions were not necessarily awarded based on merit, but
rather on an elaborate scale of patronage and favors. The
members of the GKChP had reached the pinnacle of the
pyramid. Yet Gorbachev's reforms undermined the pyramid, to
the point that the hard—liners feared, unless they took
drastic action, the pyramid would crumple.
Related to this issue is the nationalist feelings of
the members of the GKChP. A desire to save the Soviet
empire was a significant motivating factor for the coup
1 eaders.
When the chips are down, all empire-savers agree that
the preservation of the territorial integrity of the state
is more important than anything else.
Among today's most obvious empire-savers a.re the
military and the police, the state and party
bureaucracies, and members of other "all-Union" structures
and apparatuses. For the Moscow bureaucracy, the whole of
the USSR, be it Estonia or Armenia, Russia "proper" or
Moldavia, Ukraine or Uzbekistan, represents the canvas for
its "creative" undertakings. 3
._•.
By combining greed, selfishness, and the desire to save
the empire, along with the fear that the old system was
rapidly disintegrating, a case can be made for the perceived
need of the hard-liners to attempt the coup. Of importance
is the fact that this was not a military coup, but rather a
conservative coup, in which the military played a role. The
military's role was no more important than the role of the
KGB, MVD , the military-industrial complex, and the Communist
Party bureaucracy. (Realizing, of course, that the
distinction between these organizations is often blurred, as
they all tend to overlap.) As a group, these various
factions combined to try and save the old system, along with
the Soviet Union itself. This group has been labeled with a
variety of titles: hard-liners; conservatives; right-wing
communists; ant i -reformers; empire savers, etc. These terms
are all synonymous. When used in this paper, the terms are
defined as individuals who wanted to conserve the old,
pre-perestroi ka and pre-glasnost system. The GKChP and
their supporters wanted to return the Soviet Union to how
it was during Brezhnev's regime. During the 1970's the
country had become a military superpower. The economy, as
well as the people, had been controlled. Law and order was
maintained through preventive terror, ensuring that
criticism of the regime was made only in private. Public
displays of nationalism or dissatisfaction with the
Communist Party were prohibited. Glasnost and perestroi ka
were, in effect, ruining the lives of the members of the
GKChP. Through its actions, the GKChP was seeking to
protect its corporate self-interest. **
With motivation now established, the question turns to
why the coup happened when it did. In August 1991, there
existed within the Soviet Union the phenomena of multiple
power centers. s Power was effectively split between the
Moscow Center (controlled by the hard-liners) and the
various republics. Gorbachev had appeared to vacillate
between support for a strong Center and support for the
republics. Yet to the hard-liners, they realized that if
they did not act quickly, Gorbachev was going to commit
himself to the republics by signing the Union Treaty. This
treaty signing was to have occurred on 20 August, hence the
action of the coup leaders on the 19th. Therefore, the
catalyst for the coup, or why the coup attempt happened when
it did, was the need to prevent the signing of the Union
Treaty. The coup leaders felt that if the Union Treaty was
signed, their power base would be significantly reduced.
A chain of events led up to this attempt by the
right—wing conservatives to exert their corporate
self-interests. These events began with persistent rumors
that the military was preparing for a coup in September
1990. The next chapter presents a study of these rumors.
CHAPTER TWO
FOUNDATION: THE RUMORED COUP OF SEPTEMBER 1990
Throughout the summer of 1990, the re-formers within
Gorbachev's government held center stage. The 500 day
economic plan was being debated, and its implementation
seemed imminent. Discussions had begun on the future shape
and government of the USSR; (though it was not yet publicly
known as the Union Treaty, these discussions were the
beginnings of the treaty.) Independence for the Baltic
republics was being debated. The crux did not seem to be
the reforms themselves, but rather the speed of their
impl ementati on.
Yet on the horizon of Soviet politics, storm clouds
were massing. The hard-line conservatives had been dealt
blow after blow, to the point that they began to organize
themselves to re-exert their influence on Gorbachev. This
is not to say that an organized plan or time-line was drawn
up for the conservatives to follow—what is intended here is
the assessment that the hard-liners were experiencing too
many changes and set-backs too quickly. The conservatives
began to take action in an effort to slow down, if not halt,
these changes and reforms.
The affronts to the conservative way of life were
varied and broad ranging. One area of concern was the
so-called "loss" of Eastern Europe. Another concern was the
growing lack of respect for the military, caused by public
criticism and the revelations of previously closed
subjects. *> The military was also being split internally
into various factions. Some factions called for reform that
would result in a small, professional army. Others sought
depol i t i cal i zat i on of the Army. A belief existed on the
part of some others that the military needed to replace the
Communist Party as the new elite within the Soviet
Union. 7
There was also a perception of a general lack of law
and order within the country. This was manifested by
strikes, ethnic violence, widespread black market
activities, and other crimes.
All of these items were offensive to the conservatives.
Especially critical to the hard-liners was the economic path
that Gorbachev and the reformers were taking. Any step
taken towards a market economy hurt the essence of the
conservative power base, because the hard-liners gained
their power from controlling the economy. The
military-industrial complex was the most threatened by any
move towards market-oriented reforms. Nikolai Petrakov was
one of Gorbachev's economic advisers during the summer of
1990. Petrakov summarized the right-wing resistance to the
market re-forms as follows.
The military-industrial complex is in no way adapted to
the market. It doesn't know how to work in market
condi ti ons. .. Petrakov puts the moment of the
[conservative] backlash as the first days of September.
It involved the leaders of the defense industry, the army,
and the "red landowners"—the chairmen of the state farms.
He believes they were galvanized by the re-emergence of
Boris Yeltsin on the political stage, and Mr Gorbachev's
decision to work with him on economic reform. The two had
agreed to set up the 13-man Shatalin group and told it to
draw up a concept for transition to a market economy. By
the end of August, the plan was done—and the
conservatives were horrified.
The plan was openly dedicated to private property. It
would encourage the break-up of the huge state farms. And
it would impose a draconian credit squeeze on the
loss-making giants of industry, threatening most with
bankruptcy. B
As September 1990 started, the conservatives began
exerting pressure on Gorbachev to abandon the economic
reform. A key tool that was used by the right-wing was the
sudden appearance of large numbers of combat soldiers in and
around Moscow. No prior notice had been given for these
troop movements. Throughout the summer of 1990, rumors of a
military coup had been reported by the media. There was now
apparently substance to the rumors.
All summer, anytime a newspaper article appeared that
mentioned coup possibilities, it had been vehemently denied
by military authorities. Significantly, many of these
denials during the summer had come from known right-wing,
8
conservative officers. One denial came from the former
Warsaw Pact Commander-in-Chief, Marshall Viktor Kulikov. "*
Repeated denials came from a Hero of the Soviet Union,
General Boris Gromov. xo However, the media and the
public were not convinced. In September, an American
correspondent felt that suspicions were growing, especially
in Moscow.
The Soviet Union, in almost 73 years of civil wars and
purges and Kremlin intrigues, has not experienced a
mi 1 i tary coup
.
But now, when the country is living through an
unprecedented period of confusion, protest and hard times,
the fears of a coup are real. Since President Gorbachev
began his drive for economic and political reform, Moscow
has been— if a city can be said to have a personality—
a
kind of manic-depressive, swinging between euphoric hopes
of change and terrifying fears of reversal. In the past
year, as the economy has plunged, the periods of euphoria
have been r^re, the rumors of catastrophe more common. x *
The troop movements of September 1990 have never been
completely understood or explained. By utilizing a variety
of sources, the following events appeared to have occurred.
9 September: The Ryazan Airborne Division was put on
alert. Leaves were cancelled. Special 24 hour operations
centers were established. Troops began arriving in Moscow,
which is approximately 125 miles from Ryazan.
10 September: Pskov Airborne Division, which had
recently been deployed in strife torn Kirghizia, landed two
regiments in full combat gear at the Ryazan air-field.
Meanwhile, the Ryazan Airborne Division began a roadmarch
towards Moscow at 3 A.M. At approximately the same time,
the elite Dzershinsky Division of the MVD was put on alert.
This unit is made up exclusively o-f Slavic soldiers. x =
12 September: Moscow Li teraturn aya Gazeta, a liberal
newspaper, printed a lengthy article suggesting that the
High Command might be seriously considering a coup in an
effort to restore order in the country.
13 September: Mosc ow News, another liberal newspaper,
published an article in which a leader of the unofficial
military trade union known as Shchit (Shield), stated that
he had evidence that "the military leadership already has a
clear plan to take control of the situation in the
country." i:s The article specifically mentioned Gromov as
one of the likely coup leaders. x *
Also on 13 September, the Commander of the Airborne
Forces, Colonel General V. Achalov, responded to questions
by a USSR Supreme Soviet Deputy, and stated that the Ryazan
Airborne Division was moved to Moscow in preparation for the
7 November parade. Achalov also stated that the Pskov
Airborne Division had been airlifted into the Ryazan
airfield so that the division would be able to assist with
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the potato harvest. The Chairman of the Supreme Soviet,
Anatoly Lukyanov, publicly agreed with Achalov's statements.
19 September: As tensions and rumors over the troop
movements grew, Defense Minister Yazov addressed the Supreme
Soviet. Yazov confirmed that the movements had taken place,
while he stressed the same points as Colonel General
Achalov—the movements were required for parade preparations
and the potato harvest. Yazov 's remarks were broadcast on
national television.
21 September: Moscow News published an open letter
that stated a military coup was possible. One of the
signers of the letter, Colonel Vilen Martirosyan, a leader
in the military reform movement and a USSR Congress of
People's Deputy, said that "the army might be used for a
purpose for which it is not intended, and this could lead to
a seizure of power by the top military command." x "'>
24 September: A Supreme Soviet deputy stated that he
had received information that the airborne divisions were
armed with tear gas, weapons, and bullet-proof vests, and
that these divisions had been placed under the control of
the KGB. The head of the KGB, Vladimir Kryuchkov, denied
this and again repeated the parade preparation story.
1 1
25 September: A key day in terms of the information
about the rumors and coup speculation. Colonel Sergey
Kudinov, the -former deputy commander of the Ryazan Military
Academy, spoke to the Russian Federation Parliament about
the troop movements. Kudinov was fired from his position on
15 September for publishing a report on "the deteriorating
situation in the Soviet Army." rA> On 2S September, the
deputy chairman of Shchit revealed that Kudinov had been a
clandestine member of the organization for three years, but
that the organization was forced to reveal his membership
so that he could make his comments about the troop
movement. 17r Kudinov supplied an apparently eye-witness
account of the movement of troops from Ryazan to Moscow.
Kudinov stated that the men had been "specially trained" and
"ready for battle." Kudinov also remarked that four Army
divisions had been moved to Moscow since 9 September. 1S
Kudinov 's remarks were printed in Komsomol sk aya Pravd a
on 26 September. The article stated that, in Kudinov 's
opinion, the Ryazan forces were put on alert due to
information that the KGB had obtained. This information
allegedly revealed that the democratic, reform oriented
forces of the Russian government were planning an armed
seizure of important points around Moscow. 1V This is the
first indication that can be found that suggests a
left-wing, reformer coup was being planned. The
Komsomol sk aya F'ravda article also commented that the
airborne troops that were deployed were issued ammunition,
and that they left their garrison quickly and well ahead of
schedule by leaving on the 10th. According to Kudinov, the
division was scheduled to march in the November parade, but
the unit had not planned to leave for Moscow until 22
September. =i°
26 September. Defense Minister Yazov again addressed
the Supreme Soviet to refute the statements of Colonel
Kudinov that had appeared in Komsomol skaya Pravda. Yazov
repeated that the reasons for the movements were harvest and
parade related. Yazov agreed that additional forces had
been moved to Moscow for the parade, specifically elements
of the Tula Assault Division, as well as the Vitebsk
Airborne Division. Yazov also stated that the airborne
troops had been issued ammunition, because "airborne
troops—no matter where they go—always go fully equipped in
this country." = 1 The ammunition was then stored with
other units in Moscow while the soldiers prepared for the
parade. The Defense Minister cited statistics concerning
the number of soldiers harvesting potatoes in the Moscow
Military District.
An interesting aside came out of Yazov 's remarks. He
referred to the Vitebsk. Airborne Division as belonging to
the KGE-t Border Troops. This public comment was the first
13
official verification that the KGB had its own combat
divisions, which are considered as a strategic reserve to
augment their Speznaz and regular Border Troop units. 3=:
27 September: Two committees of the USSR Supreme
Soviet were ordered to investigate the controversy
surrounding the troop movements. =3 A committee was also
formed in the RSFSR Supreme Soviet to look into the
al 1 egat i ons. 'z^
29 September: Yazov told Sovetskaya Rossi ya that the
coup rumors were "deliberately circulated by left-wing
forces in order to enhance their own drive for power." ==l
Yazov also claimed that the rumors were an attempt "at
taking peoples' minds off of empty shelves and to provide an
excuse for expected hardships this winter." 2a These
comments by Yazov seemed to compliment reports that appeared
in Sovetskaya Rossi ya and Pr avd a on 26 September, and in
Kr asnaya Zvezda and Pravda on 2 October, in which democratic
leaders, such as Leningrad Mayor Anatolii Sobchak and Moscow
Mayor Gavriil Popov were accused of trying to take advantage
of the situation in a bid to seize power for themselves.
Specifically, Popov and Sobchak were accused of
"deliberately exacerbating food shortages in order to cause
the overthrow of the USSR Council of Ministers." -^
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The coup controversy never led to a military
confrontation, but it started a definite war of words among
the print media in the Soviet Union. The last week of
September and the first two weeks of October were marked by
repeated efforts by the liberal and conservative press to
blame the other's ideological backing for the crisis in the
country. Accusations of rumormongering were exchanged;
Colonel Kudinov was titled as "ignorant" or "a patriot;" and
Yazov's explanations were either supported or vilified. An
interview was published with soldiers involved in the
"attack" on the potato harvest. On 9 October, Iz vest i ya
published an article critical of all sides in the debate,
and called for a consensus to be reached. ='-e'
Just as it appeared that the coup controversy was
subsiding, new information stoked the flames. Komsomol skaya
Pravda published a letter on page 1 o-f their 12 October
edition from Major Mikhail Pustobayev, who served in a heavy
transport aircraft unit. Pustobayev stated that on 9
September his unit was alerted, the aircraft were loaded
with combat outfitted airborne troops, and the planes were
flown into an airfield located west of Moscow. The airborne
soldiers were kept in a state of emergency readiness. On 11
September, the planes with the soldiers aboard flew to a
different airport outside of Moscow. Finally, on 13
September, the soldiers were flown to their original
i
barracks and they disembarked. Pustobayev maintained that
"the idea that this might be an exercise never occurred to
those flying towards Moscow." =r? Pustobayev stated that
exercises were always planned months in advance, and he
likened the situation to 12 December 1979, when his unit was
alerted to -fly troops into Afghanistan. Pustobayev
concluded his letter by remarking that "everything that has
been said makes it possible to conclude that Minister of
Defense Yazov is deliberately refusing to clarify the
situation." 3° If the prospect of an Air Force Major
openly challenging the Minister of Defense in a letter was
not shocking enough, the television program Vzgl
y
ad aired an
interview with Pustobayev on the evening of the 12th.
Pustobayev again challenged Yazov's statements, maintaining
that previously, ammunition had been issued to airborne
troops only before they took part in activities to restore
order, like in Baku, or before involvement in Afghanistan.
Pustobayev stated that ammunition was not issued to airborne
troops for exercises, and that the movements had nothing to
do with parades or the potato harvest. Pustobayev also said
that KGB chief Kryuchkov was telling only half-truths, for
Kryuchkov must have known about the movement of the Vitebsk
Division, since it now belonged to the KGB. 31
Four days after these allegations were published and
broadcasted, Pustobayev refuted his original statements.
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Pustobayev now maintained that on 14 October, two days after
his allegations were broadcast, he was shown irrefutable
evidence by his commander that he had been part of an
elaborate exercise designed to test the capabilities of the
units involved to rapidly participate in no-notice
operations. Pustobayev's apology was displayed prominently
in the conservative Say et_skaya Rossi ya
.
I regret what happened. Now that I have studied all
the information and documents, I am convinced that these
were exercises. I honestly and sincerely tell you this.
I was confused, emotions prevailed over reason. I
reiterate: normal exercises were being held, and the
people whom I confused must know this. 3=3
The incident with Major Pustobayev only further
distorted an already confused situation. The reports
presented by the various committees that investigated the
coup controversy presented little clarification or hard
evidence. The committees' conclusions were that the
situation was still somewhat unclear, but that no coup was
attempted. The commission pointed out that special
exercises that involved airborne soldiers were conducted in
a manner that was not consistent with normal exercises, but
that they were exercises nonetheless. The committee also
added an anti-rumor statement, pointing out that: "...the
attention of persons making statements in the mass media
must be drawn to the need for irrefutable facts."
17
In summation, the troop movements and coup controversy
of September 1990 can be seen in three ways: possibility,
provocation, and paranoia. In many ways, the events of
September were used to serve many ends on behalf of many
masters. The right—wing conservatives were able to flex
their military muscle. The conservatives sent a message to
the country that the Army was still a viable force that
could be used to restore order in the country. The
liberals were able to show, however, that an army unit could
no longer be viewed as a single entity, but rather as a sum
of its parts. By publicizing the actions and statements of
Kudinov and Pustobayev, the reformers proved there were
members of the military ready to risk their careers in order
to speak out against military actions that they felt might
be directed against the Soviet people. If the Soviet people
were somewhat suspicious going into September, they were
definitely feeling apprehensive by the end of October. The
people had been presented almost daily accusations of
right-wing repressions and left-wing power grabs. High
government officials were accused of lies and attempts at a
cover—up. Items as mundane as parade preparations and the
potato harvest took on great significance.
Whatever the effect that the events of September had on
the Soviet people, one must wonder what effect the actions
had on the Soviet President. Gorbachev was as much a
IS
spectator in the events as anyone. Gorbachev heard all the
accusations and read all the reports just like anyone else,
and he had to possess some of the same doubts as the average
Soviet man on the street in Moscow. Was a coup really
possible? Did the High Command order these maneuvers to
show that they still had effective power within the country,
regardless of the gains that the reformers thought they had
made? A converse argument is that the High Command was
losing effective power: perhaps they were as surprised
about the maneuvers as anyone? Why, for instance, on 26
September, did Yazov not mention that some exercises had
been conducted and that they were finished, rather than
sticking to the "Parade and Potato Story?" Whatever the
answers were to these questions, Gorbachev obviously had
some internal doubts. No one really knows everything that
occurred, or better, why the events that did occur happened
at all. But Gorbachev had to make decisions and policies
with these doubts in mind. Gorbachev had to wonder if the
actions had been a show of support for him, or, much more
likely, a warning to him. With these doubts in mind,
Gorbachev went into a meeting on 13 November 1990 to discuss
military reform with 1,000 soldiers who had been elected to
various public offices. The Soviet President appeared
significantly more concerned about the military and the
conservatives then he had been at the beginning of August.
19
If the actions of September had been a warning, Gorbachev
seemed to get the message. Chapter Three will examine how
Gorbachev responded to the warnings.
20
CHAPTER THREE
THE SWING TO THE RIGHT
Perhaps a good way to review the meeting that Gorbachev
had with the soldiers, as well as the subsequent events in
November and December 1990, is through the words and actions
of two soldiers who attended the meeting. Colonel Viktor
Alksnis and Colonel Nikolai Petrushenko are two leaders of
the Soyuz group of deputies that has been active in the
Congress of People's Deputies (CPD) and the Supreme Soviet.
Alksnis and Petrushenko played a key role in the actions of
the Soviet Union in the period of time that is being
examined in this study. It is important to note, however,
that Alksnis and Petrushenko were little more than
self-appointed spokesmen for the right-wing. The two
colonels received extensive coverage in the media, not just
in the Soviet Union, but world-wide. Yet the colonels'
actual, personal power base was relatively limited. The
Colonels' words were often strong, but the words were
usually not as important to listeners as the perceptions and
doubts about whom these Colonels were speaking for.
Concrete evidence as to whom Alksnis and Petrushenko
represented, other than Soyuz , does not publicly exist. In
21
fact, it is very likely that Alksnis and Petrushenko were
only speaking for themselves. 3^ But the rhetoric, as well
as the actions of Soyuz , were very much in line with the
thoughts of many members of the right-wing, including the
members of the GKChP.
Soyuz was formed in February 1990. At that time,
Deputy Georgiy Komarev addressed the Supreme Soviet, and
stated that Soyuz had been formed in response to forces
within the Soviet Union that were prepared to "set fire to
our common home with the aim of warming their hands at the
embers." 3 '°'! Komarev said that these destructive forces
had to be kept from taking things too far, and he set forth
the Soyuz platform:
1. To fight to preserve the federal system and state
integrity of the USSR.
2. To resist separatism, nationalism, and chauvinism
within the country in any form or expression.
3. To strive towards the free development on a basis of
equal rights of all the peoples, nations, nationalities,
ethnic groups and of every citizen throughout the
territory of the federal state.
4. To promote the acceleration, development and adoption
of a package of most important economic laws, ensuring a
way out of the social and economic crisis and the dynamic
development of the country.
5. To create constructive foundations for substantially
improving the quality of the environment and the living
conditions of the population throughout the territory of
the federal state. '^
In an interview in March 1990 with the conservative
newspaper Sovetskaya Rossi ya , Komarev revealed more
information as to the empire-saving ideology of Soyus
.
Komarev stated that the independence movement of Lithuania,
for example, was only representing 30"/. of the people in the
republic. Komarev felt that all of the separatist movements
were discriminatory towards the various minorities within
the republics, especially Russians who lived outside the
RSFSR. Komarev stated that the main thrust of Soyuz was
human rights and equality for all people, regardless of
nationality, language or religion, or how long they have
lived within a certain territory or republic. Komarev also
commented that Soyuz would give every assistance to
strengthening the Army, KGB, and the Ministry of Internal
i
Affairs, and that it was his hope that "all who cherish the
Fatherland will be with us." 3 'r
From its inception, Soyuz grew in strength and power.
The group claimed in February 1990 to have 103 peoples'
deputies in their ranks, but within a year that number had
risen to more than 700 of the 2,250 deputies, including
deputies from all 15 republics and representing 30
nationalities. Opponents of Soyuz acknowledged that the
faction had become the largest voting bloc within the
CPD. 3«
Of the SI military men who were members of the CPD in
November 1990, Alksnis and Petrushenko were by far the most
vocal. Alksnis served as an engineer and inspector for the
Air Force main staff in the Baltic Military District, and he
represented the Yuglask National Territorial District
(Number 294) in the CPD. Petrushenko was a Senior
instructor for Propaganda and Agitation within the Political
Department of the Army, and he represented the Kazakhstan
Territorial District of Leningorsk (Number 662) in the
CPD. 3 ^
Alksnis and Petrushenko ' s names appeared in the Soviet
press in February 1990 as founders and spokesmen for Soyuz
.
The two men made headlines again in April by calling for
Presidential rule in Lithuania. But the first big boost to
the political careers of Alksnis and Petrushenko came after
the meeting with Gorbachev on 13 November. Both Alksnis and
Petrushenko were highly critical of Gorbachev at the
meeting. Alksnis told reporters after the meeting that
Gorbachev had lost the support of the military, and that the
meeting was a "dialogue between the deaf and the dumb." ^°
What transpired at the meeting was an apparent attempt
by Gorbachev to win back the military, especially the hard
line faction. Gorbachev seemed to realize that he needed
the Army more than the Army needed him. The actions of
September might have been intended to let Gorbachev know
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that he could be replaced, by -farce, if necessary. The
meeting itself was quite unusual. Gorbachev's speech was
repeatedly interrupted due to shouting from the soldiers.
One officer after another got up to voice outrage at
nationalist excesses, high desertion rates, draft evasion,
poor living conditions, the 'persecution' of Communists,
the dismantling of monuments to ...Lenin, and 'one-sided'
concessions to the West. * x
Gorbachev announced that he was prepared to take
corrective action on most of the demands. As a sign of
Gorbachev's intentions to set things right with the High
Command were two important items in his speech concerning
reforms and glasnost. Gorbachev summarily rejected the
calls for military reform that had been championed by
Vladimir Lopatin. Lopatin's plan had called for a smaller,
al 1 -prof essi onal Army and the creation of territorially
based units within the Soviet Union. Gorbachev stated that
he had studied Lopatin's proposals and he had "found them
wanting." *-' Gorbachev's comments obviously pleased the
High Command.
[Gorbachev] also sided with the High Command on the
crucial issue of glasnost, urging the media to take a more
constructive approach in their portrayal of military
affairs and arguing that negative treatment in the media
had undermined the army's prestige. His comments again
reflected those voiced by the military leadership and
reversed a policy that he himself had instigated and
encouraged. *3
However, even if the High Command was pleased with
Gorbachev's remarks, the general feeling of the right-wing
appeared to be that Gorbachev had still not gone -far enough.
Economic re-form was still planned, and reformers still held
critical positions. This situation was not to last much
longer. Gorbachev had moved closer to the right, but he was
not yet completely into the hard-line fold. The rhetoric
and threats intensified.
Alksnis and Petrushenko were now used extensively. On
17 November Alksnis addressed the CPD , stating that he was
speaking for Soyuz . Alksnis first mentioned that he
supported Gorbachev's plan for a federation of republics;
then he addressed Gorbachev personally:
Yes, we have had a conflict with you. But I can tell you
the following: I personally and my voters and the Army
support any of your actions aimed at preserving union and
at strengthening our state power, at the salvation of the
state. That I promise you and I will assist all this to
the maximum. But I want to say that the credit of
confidence in you has been exhausted. You have 30 days
left. If by the fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies
there is no radical turn-around of the state of affairs,
it is obvious that at the fourth Congress the question of
you personally will be resolved. I do not want this to
sound like a threat to you, but simply that this will be
realized. ^
In an interview published a few days later, Alksnis stated
that Gorbachev "acts only when it's too late. His decrees
remind me of a hurried man who gets to the train platform
just in time to get the last train. Even those belated
decrees are ignored." ^s Less than a week after Alksnis
addressed the Congress, Petrushenko followed him to the
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podium to remind Gorbachev that he had 24 days left, and if
he had not acted by that time "we shall have to form some
kind of national salvation committee." ***
The assumption can be made that these speeches and
their stated threats were taken seriously by Gorbachev,
because a major turn-around did take place. The first step
was taken when Gorbachev abandoned the Shatalin economic
plan. The second step was on 23 November, when Gorbachev
appeared to try to intimidate independence minded republics
at a televised press conference. Two nights later, Defense
Minister Dmitri i Yazov used some of the same strong words in
speaking out against anti-union forces. Then, on 27
November, Yazov again spoke to a TV audience and announced
that the armed forces had been authorized to use force
against demonstrators to protect military installations and
personnel . *~'
A third major step by Gorbachev was the dismissal of
Interior Minister Vadim Bakatin on 2 December. Bakatin was
replaced by Boris Pugo, the former Latvian KGB chief and
Communist Party leader. Named to be Pugo ' s deputy was
General Boris Gromov, the former commander of Soviet forces
in Afghanistan. Alksnis was quoted as seeing the removal of
Bakatin as a sign that "steps s.ris being taken to carry out
Gorbachev's program for stabilizing the situation in the
country." *«3 Alksnis also commented that Bakatin 's
removal was required because Bakatin was "-fully responsible
-for the blood spilt in Moldavia- He was not only passive,
but he rendered concrete support to separatist forces in the
republics." -*'*' TASS reported that Soyuz had campaigned -for
the removal of Bakatin. One Soyuz member had not only
predicted Bakatin 's removal, but the deputy also stated that
"the turn (to resign or be removed) of other people who do
not suit Soyuz would come very soon." ao This prediction
came true on 20 December with the resignation of Eduard
Shevardnadze.
During Shevardnadze's resignation speech, he referred
to Alksnis and Petrushenko as the "boys in colonel 's
epaulets." SS1 Shevardnadze then asked a critical question
about Alksnis and Petrushenko: "What is surprising, and I
think we should think seriously: who is behind these
comrades and why is no one rebuffing them?" ss:s This was an
excellent question that was to remain unanswered.
Two key reformers, Bakatin and Shevardnadze, had been
removed from Gorbachev's government. Yet the swing to the
right was still not complete. The position of
Vice-President had been established in the Soviet Union, and
reformers
...had conjured up their profile of a probable
Vice-President: a non-Russian to unite the country, a
person of popular stature or at least a winning public
figure to repair Mr. Gorbachev's diminished prestige, and
someone with a reformist reputation. 53
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The reformer's optimistic hopes were crushed when Gorbachev
nominated Gennadi Yanaev, the consummate Party bureaucrat,
to the position. Yanaev stressed in his nomination speech
that the country needed a return to law and order, and that
it needed to move away from economic "shock therapy." ^^
The Yanaev nomination was at first defeated, and when it
passed on the second ballot, fraud allegations were made by
reformist groups who had opposed Yanaev. Gorbachev had made
a very strong appeal for Yanaev between the first and second
ballots, telling the CPD that: "I want someone alongside me
that I can trust." Ksa Soyuz apparently played a strong
role in Yanaev's election. The new Vice-President told TASS
that he gave "wholehearted support" to Soyuz. =,<s>
The final personnel piece that was needed to complete
the swing to the right was the appointment of Valentin
Pavlov as Prime Minister. Like Yanayev, Pavlov was a
career, hard-core communist, who had risen to power through
a variety of jobs in the command-economy system, including
high level positions in the State Committee of Prices and
Gosplan. Pavlov had also served as the Minister of
Finance. 3V
The swing to the right by Gorbachev laid the foundation
for the August 1991 coup attempt. Of course, the
possibility exists that the coup might have been attempted
even if Gorbachev had not swung to the right. One can
speculate that the coup attempt might have happened sooner
than August, and that Gorbachev's movement away from reform
only delayed the attempt. Yet beyond speculation is the fact
that Gorbachev's mistake of whom he could trust greatly
influenced the August coup.
A key question concerning the personnel changes made in
December and January is whether Gorbachev acted of his own
accord, or was he forced to make changes. The forced school
of thought follows the belief that throughout the Winter of
1990-1991, Gorbachev was no more than a puppet, being
controlled by the KGB and the High Command. This argument
can be persuasive, but it deteriorates if it is tracked out
to 23 April 1991, when Gorbachev announced the agreement
that was reached with the majority of the republics
concerning the Union Treaty. If Gorbachev was only a
puppet, why was he allowed to negotiate the treaty?
The second argument, that Gorbachev changed on his own,
is more believable, and the best answer seems to be a
combination of the two arguments. This assumes that in
November 1990 Gorbachev still wanted economic reform and a
Union Treaty, but that he was concerned about holding onto
power through the winter. This concern led to Gorbachev's
pragmatic swing to the right, but also allowed him to revert
back to his reform path in the spring.
SO
In either case, Gorbachev had three days alone in his
summer vacation dacha in August 1991 to reflect on his
mistakes concerning whom he -Felt he could trust. The
mistakes Gorbachev made in personnel appointments manifested
themselves in the form of the GKChP. As of this writing,
what was the USSR is collapsing, in large part having been
pushed towards collapse by the failure of the GKChP, which
is reviewed in the next chapter. The probability is high
that Gorbachev's mistake was a key element in the beginning
of the end of the Soviet Union.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE PROMISE OF FAILURE
For more than 70 years, the people of the Soviet Union
were oppressed. Mass terror was a tool used quite
effectively by the leaders of the Communist Party. The
people were very docile and submissive. The opinions of the
citizens were not sought out by leaders, and expressions of
nationalism were censured. Whenever elections were
conducted, the results were planned and organized well
before any actual voting took place. Changes in the
leadership of the country were made and the results were
then announced to the people. There was no input from
below; everything was fed down from the top.
Various institutions within the Soviet Union helped
contribute to the repression. The Armed Forces, the KGB,
and the media all played enormous roles in suppressing the
people. Independent thoughts and ideas were discouraged;
independent actions were outlawed. Preventive terror was
the law of the land. Collectivization, purges, show trials,
the Gulag—these were but a -few of the items in the litany
of terror and repression that was the Soviet Union. Many
believe that this submi ssi veness on the part of the people
pre-dates the beginnings of the Soviet Union.
Writers and historians have believed -for centuries that
the Russians are uniquely ill-disposed to freedom. "All
the people consider themselves to be slaves of their
prince," wrote a 16th-century German traveler to Russia.
That assessment would endure. Alexander Pushkin deemed
his countrymen obedient "sheep." In Dostoevsky's The
Brother's Karamazov, the Grand Inquisitor tells Christ
that "in the end, the people will lay their -freedom at our
feet and say: 'Make us your slaves, but -feed us. ' " s"a
The Soviet Union was a diverse empire that covered
large land areas on two continents. The country had a
population of nearly 300 million people, belonging to
approximately 85 ethnic groups. The people were united in
only one regard: fear. Fear held the Soviet Union
together. Fear kept nationalistic feelings in check. Fear
insured that the people stayed docile and subservient. But
over the last 5 years, there were major changes. Mikhail
Gorbachev's reforms changed the institutions that repressed
the people. These changes gave the people freedom and
removed their fears and their historic feelings of
submission. The removal of fear did not happen all at once,
and it was not removed from all the people. Yet fear has
been removed in sufficient enough quantities to change world
affairs. A lack of fear defeated the coup of August 1991.
In some regards, the fear did not leave the Soviet
Union, but instead, the fear shifted. As the people lost
their fear, the self-appointed leaders began to experience
it. The Committee for the State of Emergency (GKChP) was a
small group of men who were afraid. The GKChP had watched
Gorbachev's reforms lead to the removal of the preventive
terror that had kept the people submissive. The hard-line
conservatives had resisted Gorbachev's reforms; they tried
to undermine and sabotage the changes in many areas.
However, in spite of the conservatives' efforts, the empire
that the Communist Party controlled was in danger of
crumbling into segments o-f nationalism. A Union Treaty that
would have formally shifted power away from the Center to
the republics was to be signed on 20 August. This caused
the GKChP to act when it did. The GKChP acted in an attempt
to go back in time to when fear ruled the country and
nationalism was repressed. But the actions of the GKChP
came to late.
There are already numerous interpretations as to why
the coup failed. Some are -fairly simplistic. For instance,
one theory holds that the coup failed because the eight
members of the GKChP appeared to be drunk the entire time.
Although this may well be true, it is not, in itself, a
cause that insured the failure of the coup. The drinking
was probably only a symptom of deeper causes of the coup's
f ai 1 ure.
Others have argued that the coup failed due to the
faulty tactics employed by the coup leaders. This theory
points out that the coup was begun on a Monday; a better
time would have been on a Saturday. The followers of the
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tactical failure theory also point out that Boris Yeltsin
should have been arrested or killed, and that communication
networks were not seized in a timely manner, or at all. The
main problem with this theory is it leads one to think that,
had the GKChP acted differently, the coup might have been
successful. This, however, is most improbable. The coup
failed because enough of the people refused to be pushed
back in time. Had the coup occurred four years earlier, it
quite possibly would have succeeded. Yet the coup was
probably condemned to fail as early as the summer of 1989,
as the policies of glasnost and perestroika began to
irrevocably change the social structure of the Soviet Union
and Eastern Europe. The GKChP either misunderstood or
underestimated these changes.
The rise in nationalism within the Soviet Union helped
both to cause the coup and insure its failure. The desire
to save the Soviet Empire was a key motive for the GKChP.
Yet this form of Soviet nationalism was adequately
countered, especially within the Baltics and the RSFSR, by a
nationalistic fervor that the eight—man committee was
ill-equipped to defeat. The coup was the last act of
desperate men who likely knew that their effort would be in
vain, for the destiny of the coup was failure.
This chapter will focus on four key elements of the
failure of the coup. These elements are the GKChP itself,
the media, the Soviet Armed Forces, and the people. As
these elements are discussed, attention will also be paid to
interactions between events in the Soviet Union and outside
influences, especially the influence of Western countries.
A brief review of the linkage of Mikhail Gorbachev's foreign
and domestic reforms is therefore warranted.
THE LINKAGE OF FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC REFORMS
In February 1990, an ultra-conservative unofficial
Soviet newspaper, Svobodnoye Slovo, published a cartoon of
Gorbachev. In the cartoon, Gorbachev is doing a strip-tease
for Uncle Sam. On the ground around Gorbachev lie various
articles of clothing that have already been removed. Each
article has a label: "Hungary," "Poland," "GDR," etc. Also
around Gorbachev's feet lie the missiles that the Soviet
Union gave up in the INF Treaty. The cartoon also shows
Gorbachev removing another piece of clothing which is
labeled "Romania." An appreciative Uncle Sam is throwing
dollar bills at Gorbachev as he removes the piece of
clothing. The cartoon seems to summarize how many
conservatives felt towards Gorbachev's foreign policy. In
many instances, Gorbachev appeared quite willing to trade
land or military equipment for Western currency.
This trade-off of land and equipment for aid was not
what Gorbachev had intended when he became leader of the
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Soviet Union. In Perestroi ka , Gorbachev alludes to just
the opposite. He criticizes the West for historically using
detente in an effort to destabilize the Soviet Union and its
allies whenever the Soviet economy seemed to stagnate. <t>°
Gorbachev believed that by strengthening the Socialist
system, he could use strength to reduce confrontation. This
would allow for a move "towards peaceful coexistence and
mutually beneficial cooperation." A l Gorbachev clearly saw
the interaction that was needed between his foreign policy
and his domestic reforms.
In terms of foreign relations, Gorbachev discerned the
requirement for a policy that would stabilize the
international environment. By making relations between the
Soviet Union and the West more predictable, Gorbachev could
then concentrate on his domestic reforms. <i> -- The need to
restructure the Soviet economy was Gorbachev's biggest
challenge, and improving relations with the West was a means
of receiving Western investment and technology. In line
with the restructuring of the economy, domestic reforms were
needed. Glasnost was implemented as a means to energize the
nation by having the Soviet media and the people report on
inefficiency within the economic system. <s,:5 Glasnost was
not intended to become an impetus for nationalistic
expressions, nor was it envisioned to be a Western-style
freedom of the press. Yet it was perceived as such by many
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in the West. Of course, any changes in Soviet domestic
policy that improved its appearance to the West was welcomed
by Gorbachev. The release of Andrei Sakharov from internal
exile in December 1986 is an example of this linkage, for it
was seen throughout the West as evidence of Gorbachev's
willingness to improve respect for human rights within the
USSR. And while Sakharov 's release was a sign of
improvement, an indication to the West was probably not
Gorbachev's primary intention. In reality, Gorbachev
invited Sakharov out. of exile as a sign to the Soviet
intelligentsia that domestically, Gorbachev needed their
assistance to restructure the economy. *"*
Gorbachev's reforms led to an avalanche of historically
significant events: the INF Treaty, the fall of the Berlin
Wall and the Iron Curtain, the reunification of Germany, and
the CFE Treaty. Within the USSR, reforms were also yielding
results at a breathtaking pace. The communist ideology was
dying, and in its place were nationalistic fervor and
proclamations of independence by the republics. Ethnic
unrest was growing, and Gorbachev was perceived as losing
control. The hard—line conservative communists especially
viewed Gorbachev in this manner. The conservatives saw the
years 1985-1990 as a downward spiral. As each change was
made, the conservatives lost more power and more influence.
The conservatives began to sense growing disorder within the
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country, and a loss of security outside the country- The
conservatives believed, although Gorbachev's policy of "New
Thinking" was bringing in millions of dollars and Deutsche
marks in aid, the money was not enough to offset the
vulnerability that the Soviet Union now faced. This
vulnerability was viewed from a perception that a united
Germany, which many conservatives had argued against, could
be a threat. ^^ The conservatives also strongly criticized
Gorbachev's foreign policy for allowing the Warsaw Pact to
dissolve while NATO remained intact, and for making what
they felt were one-sided concessions in the treaties that
had been negotiated. Some also attacked Gorbachev for his
position on the US-led coalition in Saudi Arabia, calling
Gorbachev's actions "appeasement." <s <t>
This perceived downward spiral culminated with the
August 1991 coup attempt. The conservatives had the
impression that Gorbachev had led the country from
superpower status to that of a beggar nation. The GKChP
felt that if Gorbachev was allowed to continue, and the
union treaty was signed, then all would be lost. The need
for the GKChP to save the empire had been brought on in no
small part by the linkage between Gorbachev's domestic and
foreign policies. Since the coup, former Defense Minister
Yazov has stated that the GKChP also acted out of fear that
Gorbachev was making the Soviet Union "dependent on the
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United States," not just economically, but also politically
and militarily. <s' 5' Unfortunately -for the eight members of
the GKChP, they did not realize that who they were and what
they represented was to be a leading cause for the failure
of the coup.
THE GKChP
The hard-line, conservative communists began their
efforts to consolidate their powers and stop Gorbachev's
reforms during the Fall of 1990. Personnel changes were
made within the Soviet government, the most important of
which was the resignation of Eduard Shevardnadze in December
1990. Shevardnadze had come under intense criticism by the
right wing for his conduct of Soviet foreign policy. <s>°
The main complaint against Shevardnadze was that he had lost
Eastern Europe, resulting in the need for the Soviet
military to conduct "a disorderly, almost humiliating
retreat." ^'•' Conservatives called for criminal
investigations of Shevardnadze's conduct as foreign
minister. This led some to speculate that a charge of
treason against Shevardnadze could be used to discredit all
foreign policies made under him, thereby delaying troop
withdrawals and the ratification of treaties. ^° In his
resignation speech, Shevardnadze had warned that a
dictatorship was coming. 7 1 This prophecy seemed to be
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coming true when the Soviet military began a crackdown in
the Baltics in January 1971. National Salvation Committees
appeared ready to take over power in the rebellious
republics, as well as in the RSFSR. 72 Yet the crackdown
was quickly terminated amidst much con-Fusion and denial of
responsi bi 1 i ty
.
In retrospect, the bungling of the January crackdown
was just a preview o-f the misadventures of the GKChP in
August. On paper, the right wing appeared to have the power
necessary in January to forcibly bring change and
re—establish law and order in the Baltics, and from there
spread authoritarian rule throughout the Soviet Union. Yet
the conservatives did not follow through with their use of
force. One factor for the hesitation might have been
concern over the reaction of the US and other Western
nations, but this is improbable. The thought that the US or
NATO would have responded militarily to assist the Baltics
is not within the realm of possibility. Diplomatically, the
US had its attention devoted to the events unfolding in the
Middle East. Had the crackdown continued, relations between
the Soviet Union and the West would have suffered, and
Western aid would have been withheld, but that is not enough
of a threat to be the primary motivation for the hard-liners
stopping the actions. ^^ A better explanation for the
termination of activities in the Baltics is that the
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crackdown appeared to be doomed by a lack of a clear plan or
organization, and the absence of a leader for the hard-line
communists to unite around.
The right wing conservatives seemed crippled by
indecision. Especially -frustrating to the conservatives was
the Gorbachev riddle: whose side was he really on?
Gorbachev was like a pendulum, swinging from the left to the
right, from reform to hard-line. The available evidence
seems to suggest that Gorbachev supported the initial
actions in the Baltics, but. then refused to allow them to
continue, and the conservatives were not yet willing to take
actions into their own hands. 7j*
By August, however, the conservatives felt they had
waited on Gorbachev long enough. Yet their attempt to
remove Gorbachev was doomed to fail. The eight members of
the GKChP had nothing to offer the diverse peoples of the
Soviet Union, not even the Russians. The GKChP did not have
a plan of action; theirs was a plan of inaction. The goal
of the GKChP was to gain control of the country and to stop
the reforms, yet they offered no plan to replace the
reforms. The plan to gain control might have been able to
put food into the stores in the short-run, but in the
long-run the GKChP was offering the same broken system that
over the last 70 years had nearly bankrupted the USSR. The
members of the GKChP were tainted by the Communist Party.
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The GKChP was made-up of the same old faces that totally
lacked any charisma. Reformers like Boris Yeltsin may not
have had a clear plan for recovery to present to the people
on 19 August 1991, but he at least offered a promise of
change.
Perhaps the GKChP thought, since Gorbachev was held in
such low esteem throughout the country, removing him from
power would be a means of gaining support from the people.
If this was part of the GKChP ' s thought-process, they badly
miscalculated. In the extremely diverse country that was
the Soviet Union, practically the only way to unite all the
various ethnic factions in 1991 was a threat to return the
country to the authoritarian days of the past. The people
had tasted freedom, and they refused to return to a
totalitarian system, thereby resisting their historical
tendency to submi ssi veness.
The GKChP was also condemned to fail due to a lack of
ruth 1 essness. No one on the committee seemed ready to order
the violence against the civilian population that would have
been necessary for them to hold power. ''"^ Yet even if the
area around the Russian White House had been turned into a
Soviet version of Tiananmen Square, it is improbable that
this would have been enough for the GKChP to quash
resistance and to gain success. To overcome the opposition
to it, the GKChP would have needed to conduct dozens of
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massacres across the country. The coup was not just opposed
in Moscow, Leningrad, and the Baltics, but across the entire
Soviet Union. An attempt at a total crackdown would have
proved to be impossible. If a group o-f protesters had been
arrested or killed, it seems likely that another group would
have appeared to protest the arrest or killings o-f the -first
group. In the end, this attempt to regain law and order
would most likely have resulted in an uncontrollable spiral
of disorder and chaos, and splits between the Army, KGB, and
MVD.
Another significant cause for the failure of the BKChP
to stay in power for more than three days was its dealings
with the media. The fear that had pushed the GKChP into
action was evident to all of the USSR and around the world
on the evening of 19 August, the first day of the coup.
In what might have been one of the largest tactical blunders
made by the GKChP, a press conference was held with five of
the eight members of the GKChP. One has to wonder what the
GKChP hoped to accomplish by staging a media event in front
of many of the reporters whose publications had been
"temporarily banned" that same morning. ~'** When Nikita
Khrushchev was ousted in 1964, the move was announced, and
no one tried to explain it. More recently, when martial law
was declared in Poland at the end of 19S1, the emergency
committee imposed a ban on all press activities. This news
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blackout lasted for three days. ~'~' Yet the GKChP felt the
need to stage a media event, and this leads to an
examination of a second key element in the failure of the
coup.
THE MEDIA
The following citation was the lead for a commentary
printed in Izvesti ya the day after the coup's collapse:
It is 1800 on 19 August; the GKChP presentation at
the... Press Center has just ended; it had been repeatedly
interrupted by outbursts of contemptuous laughter: The
people sitting behind the table on the platform were no
longer invoking fear they were loathsome and pathetic; it
is not accidental that now the television just loves
showing the panorama of these faces.
Exiting from the room, Otto Latsis told me: "I am
afraid to admit it, but I seem to be feeling something
akin to cautious optimism. Such people a.rs doomed."
I checked it later: Quite a few people sensed the
same. The junta was doomed as soon as it showed itself to
the people. How could these people with shaking hands,
trembling lips, and shifty eyes lay claim to power over
the great country? 7va
This i s an excellent summation of how the GKChP was
viewed after the press conference. How could the committee
of salvation possibly save an empire when it could not even
control a press conference? An examination of the
transcript of the conference reveals that 21 people asked
questions. 7 ^ Eight questions were asked by foreign
journalists, and at least two questions were asked by
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reporters whose newspapers had been banned that very
morning. Thirteen of the 21 questioners can be interpreted
as being openly hostile towards the GKChP and its actions.
For example, some demanded information about Gorbachev, or
others asked about the constitutionality of the GKChP's
decrees. One journalist asked if the GKChP had called
General Pinochet for advice. e,°
An especially significant question was asked by a
reporter from Pravda, one of the newspapers not banned by
the GKChP that morning. The question started out to be a
general inquiry on how the GKChP was going to fix the
economy. But then the reporter skillfully added a political
statement into a second question. Rather than just asking
the GKChP what they thought about the resistance to them
being organized by Boris Yeltsin, the reporter repeated
parts of Yeltsin's statement. Yeltsin was quoted by the
reporter as calling the events a "right wing, reactionary,
anti-constitutional coup," and the reporter also mentioned
that Yeltsin was calling for a "general, indefinite
strike." ™ l The GKChP had been trying all day to suppress
any information on Yeltsin's activities, and here, at their
own press conference, one of the reporters from a newspaper
the GKCHP thought it could trust told a nationwide audience
about Yeltsin's statements. Later that evening, the Vremya
newscast, which had been given strong orders to support the
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junta, briefly carried a report on Yeltsin's appeal to the
people. This was much to the chagrin of the GKChP, which
thought it had taken enough steps to insure censorship of
the television program. H~ The GKChP did an even sloppier
job of censorship outside of Moscow: in Leningrad, the
television station and the print media were never affected,
and they continued to broadcast and print anti—GKChP items
throughout the coup. &zs
Other contrr i butors to the failure of the GKChP were the
copying machine and the fa.-:. After the coup, Eduard
Shevardnadze said: "Freedom of information is an
inalienable aspect of freedom and democracy. Praised be
information technology." m* This use of technology was
significant. Mimeographed sheets of all of Yeltsin's
decrees were handed out around Moscow. Letters of support
from agencies ranging from a group of naval officers to
labor union leaders were faxed to the Russian White House,
and then copied and distributed. An emergency phone
directory was published and circulated around Yeltsin's
headquarters. This directory listed one number for "first
hand information from the streets." fc,:= A short-wave radio
station was also established at the White House, and its
frequency was passed by word of mouth.
Special editions of banned newspapers were produced on
word processors and typewriters, then ;;ero;:ed and
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distributed. Some copies were posted on walls in subway
stations- "^ The banned newspaper Rossi ya , which is the
organ o-F the Presidium o-f the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, ran the
following message on the bottom of each page of its special
editions: "Read and pass onto someone else— If you can,
make copies!" ey7~
Foreign journalists also played a role in the defeat of
the coup. The GKChP made no known attempt to expel or
silence foreign reporters, probably in an effort to avoid
confrontation with Western countries. Western radio and
television stations increased their news broadcasts into the
Soviet Union. Gorbachev, like many others, received
information via radio from the BBC, Radio Liberty, and Voice
of America. Sl3 The BBC even gave up some of its
frequencies to the banned Radio Rossi i . m 'v And to again
quote Shevardnadze:
"Praised be CNN. Anyone who owned a parabolic antenna
able to receive this network's transmissions had a
complete picture of what was happening. Meanwhile
Cofficial Soviet] television emitted murky waves of lies
and disinformation. '"
THE ARMED FORCES
The actions of the Soviet armed forces (for purposes of
this study, armed forces includes the military and the
troops assigned to the KGB and the MVD) during the coup had
some historical precedent. Throughout its history, the
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Russian army never has taken power -for itself, but it has
influenced numerous leadership changes. This has been
accomplished by either giving support to one faction, or by
withholding support, leading to the downfall of an
individual or group. This is what occurred in August. The
armed forces practiced their historical tendency. A few
military units supported the GKChP, and a few more units
appeared to have resisted the coup attempt. The majority of
the armed forces seemed to wait on the sidelines, not
supporting either side.
Much has already been written about the split within
the Soviet military: the higher ranking officers were
generally conservative communists, while the younger
officers and soldiers, if they have any political feelings
at all, are predominately reform-oriented. The tradition
for the Russian military is to find someone to throw its
support behind; to find a political ally. The results of
August are inconclusive. The military certainly did not
support the GKChP in large enough numbers for the committee
to have been successful. But it would be incorrect to
unequivocally state that the majority of the military gave
its support to Boris Yeltsin. The point to be made is that
the military is still searching for a political ally. This
ally might in fact turn out to be Yeltsin, but that is not a
definite conclusion at this time. The military is still
waiting, like most people, to see the -future direction of
the former Soviet Union.
The last six years have brought tremendous change to
the Soviet armed -Forces. Glasnost has especially hurt the
military's senior leadership: it exposed the loss of the
war in Afghanistan; caused a decline in the military's
prestige; and led to budget reductions, civilian
interference, and the discharge of a large number of
officers. 'i' 1 This discharge of officers, required by the
reductions that Gorbachev ordered in 198S, has been
estimated by former Defense Minister Yazov as numbering
100,000 officers, including 35,000 who had not served long
enough to be entitled to pensions. ,2
Of even greater concern to many within the armed forces
has been a perception that Soviet national security was
diminished by Gorbachev. The KGB and MVD lost much of their
ability to control internal security as they were barred
from practicing preventive terror. As reforms led to
reductions of intrusive interference, the country moved away
from its authoritarian past. The external threat to the
Soviet Union was also perceived by some as being a grave
danger. Conservative critics maintained that a strong
military policy had kept the USSR free from attack for over
45 years, but now Gorbachev's foreign policies have
threatened the security of the Soviet Union. Much of this
50
was mentioned above, but a few examples will further amplify
the military feelings of vulnerability.
Colonel Viktor Alksnis of the conservative group Soyuz
was quoted in July 1991 as stating:
The threat to the Soviet Union has increased. I
support our leaving Eastern Europe—but only if the United
States also leaves Western Europe. If we leave Cam Ranh
Bay (in Vietnam) , the US should leave the Philippines.
We dissolved the Warsaw Pact, but the West did not
dissolve NATO. Instead, the military forces of the US are
still in the Persian Gulf region—they are still there, in
spite of promises to withdraw. From the north of Iraq to
the Soviet border is only a very short distance. v;5
Another example is an article written about Colonel
General Boris Gromov, the former commander of Soviet troops
in Afghanistan, and the former deputy minister of the MVD.
One of the most strongly worded manifestations Cof
opposition to Gorbachev's foreign policy] was an article
by [Gromov, published in early 1990]. He charged that the
United States, unlike the USSR, was "not hurrying to
reduce its armed forces, or to withdraw its troops from
the territories of other countries." The military
doctrines of NATO and the US continued to be aggressive,
he added, concluding not only that the US continued to
seek "strategic superiority" over the USSR, but that "the
forces of reaction have not abandoned their efforts to
destabilize conditions in the world, especially in
Socialist countries." 'v^
Former Defense Minister Yazov grew increasingly vocal
in his criticism of "New Thinking" in the months leading up
to the coup. In early March 1991, Yazov attacked the CFE
agreement, stating that "Moscow had made too many
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concessions in negotiating it." ~' zi At the All-Army Party
Conference in late March, Yazov made the keynote address.
CYazov] went on to address claims that the Soviet Union
no longer faced a military threat from the West. Such
claims, he contended, "are nothing more than the
speculation of politicians trying to satisfy their
personal ambitions at any price—even by destroying the
country's defense system." Taking aim at a cornerstone of
the new political thinking—the idea that war has ceased
to be an extension of politics—Yazov said that the Gulf
war demonstrated that military force continues to be a
means of settling international disputes. He also railed
against efforts by the West to obtain what he called
one-sided advantages in the military sphere, to destroy
strategic parity, and to establish a "new order" in the
world by strong-arm tactics. 'v *>
Yazov was followed to the podium by Colonel General Nikolai
Shlyaga, the head of the Army and Navy Main Political
Administration, who stated that the "process of detente is
still not irreversible." ">'
Yet all of these conservative outcries stand out as
old-fashioned, communist rhetoric. The Soviet High Command
needed an external enemy to maintain its large size, its
prestige, its budget, and its privileges. As the officially
sponsored perception of threat from traditional Western
enemies diminished, the military's role has begun to change
to that of an internal police force, which is a duty that
the military does not welcome. s"a What is left to the
Soviet armed forces, according to an American journalist, is
the realization that they have:
No credible enemy. No animating ideology. No unifying
sense of nationhood. No appetite for foreign adventurism
or domestic riot control. The Soviet Military, more than
4 million strong, is awash in its own irrelevance. t>"y
The actions of the GKChP in August were in part an
attempt to regain relevance for the Soviet armed forces.
Had the GKChP been successful, a return to the Cold War
would not have been improbable. Yet the GKChP was not able
to immediately offer the armed forces anything that the
soldiers could rally around, and this cost the committee the
support of the military. The GKChP was not able to offer a
"smoking gun" or a tangible enemy to the army. As tanks
rolled through the streets of Moscow, the only enemy was the
people, the only targets were crowds, buses, and barricades
that had been erected under the orders of the one man who
had political legitimacy. In comparison to the GKChP,
Yeltsin was the only person who had a legal basis to be
issuing orders. Yeltsin had been democratically elected,
with many in the military voting for him. ,0°
Yeltsin had worked hard to win the favor of the
military during his election campaign. This was not easy
for Yeltsin, for he carried a reputation as being
ant i —mi 1 i tary . This reputation was at least partially
earned by Yeltsin in 19S7. Shortly after the landing of a
small airplane in Red Square by Mathias Rust, Yeltsin
rebuked the officers of the Moscow Military District in
Krasnaya Zvezda, the daily newspaper of the armed forces,
Yeltsin's attack extended far beyond the failure to
intercept Rust's aircraft. "Rudeness, boorishness, and
intimidation," Yeltsin said, were widespread in the
officer corps and had given rise to "toadies, bootlickers,
sycophants, and window dressers." He went on to say, "An
atmosphere of smugness, boasting, and complacency has
emerged everywhere. This atmosphere deprives active
people of initiative and the ability to assert a correct
viewpoint" and encourages "a style that blunts the cutting
edge of the idea of the motherland's security." lox
A key to Yeltsin's appeal to the military during the
election was his selection of Alexander Rutskoi to be his
vice-president. Rutskoi had earned a "Hero of the Soviet
Union" in Afghanistan, and was well respected in the
military. Rutskoi had been very critical of the military
crackdown in the Baltics in January 1991, especially
concerning Gorbachev's evading responsibility for the deaths
by blaming the local army commander. 5 o:2
Yeltsin also campaigned heavily at military posts
across the RSFSR. One of Yeltsin's major campaign speeches
was delivered at an Army barracks in Tula, where an elite
Airborne Division was stationed. Yeltsin evidently made a
great impression on the soldiers stationed there, promising
to build them an extra 500 apartments, as well as offering
them a share in the royalties from his autobiography. L °3
Yeltsin's selection of this unit seems especially fortunate,
for during the coup, this airborne unit was among the first
that was ordered by the GKChP to surround the Russian White
House. The orders were refused.
As the coup progressed, Yeltsin took his appeals
directly to the soldiers and officers. On the second night
of the coup, Yeltsin recorded an appeal that was rebroadcast
whenever possible.
I appeal to you, soldiers and officers of Russia. Do
not let yourself be turned into blind weapons to defend
privileges. In this difficult hour, distinguish real
truth from lies. Do not dishonor Russia by shedding the
blood of your own people. The days of the plotters are
numbered. Law and constitutional order will be
victorious. Russia will be free. 10 "*
Around Moscow, flyers were made available for citizens to
hand to the soldiers. The flyers read:
SOLDIERS! OFFICERS! Fulfill your obligation before the
law and the Fatherland. Support Russian President
Yeltsin and your elected People's Deputies. Tanks under
the command of Major Yevdokeemov a.rs positioned to defend
the Russian Parliament Building. Follow the example of
Major Yevdokeemov and his soldiers. lo;:5
Appeals like this presented the soldiers with two
options: obey the GKChP, or obey Yeltsin. The first option
meant following the orders of Communist Party bureaucrats.
These bureaucrats had little power, and what power they did
have was of a questionable legal and constitutional basis.
The end result of the first option would more than likely
require the soldiers to fire on unarmed civilians, some of
whom might have been relatives.
The second option allowed the soldiers to follow the
orders of a democratically elected leader, who seemed to be
speaking from a firm legal basis. The second option would
presumably avoid violence against civilians, for units could
actively support Yeltsin or remain neutral. If a unit
rejected the first option, there appears to have been little
pressure to follow the orders of the GKChP. For instance,
when the KGB's elite Alpha Unit refused to attack the
Russian Parliament Building, no disciplinary action was
taken against them. A court-martial was threatened, but
there was no follow-up. 10<i> The armed forces had no reason
to fear the GKChP. Although some units followed the orders
of the GKChP, enough units refused to help ensure the
committee's failure. Yet one must be careful to not assume
that when a military unit refused to support the GKChP, the
unit gave de facto support to Yeltsin. This was not the
case. Future attempts to control the deteriorating
situation in the republics might be led by an individual or
group that gains the support of significant segments of the
armed forces.
THE PEOPLE
The final element that led to the defeat of the coup
was the people. Some citizens appeared to support the coup,
while many others seemed apathetic. Yet enough people
decided to take a largely symbolic stand against the GKChP
to cause its downfall. The social resistance to the coup
was not just in Moscow, Leningrad and the Baltics, but
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throughout the USSR. As the coup progressed, the social
rebellion grew in size and scale. General strikes were
announced throughout the country. The people did not seem
to -fear the GKChP. As time went on, and concern about a
military attack lessened, the resistance by the people grew
even stronger. In one important respect, there appeared to
have been a role reversal within the Soviet Union during the
coup. For 70 years, the leaders possessed clear power, and
all the society had was fear. Yet as the coup progressed,
the power seemed to be with the mobs in the streets, and the
fear seemed to rest with the SKChP.
This shift in -fear had been coming about for quite some
time—the coup was only the latest manifestation of the
phenomenon. The first step to the reversal of fear had been
a combination of the moral collapse of the people, coupled
with the death of the "Lie of Communism." 107- The moral
collapse was summed up with a feeling of despair by the
people, brought on by the realization that everything was
broken. As the lie died,
...not only were the long decades of Stalin and Brezhnev
swept away, but the very foundations of Sovietism, the
economic theories of Marx and the political practices of
Lenin, were touched. By 19SS Marxism-Leninism was a
shambles; and by 1989 it could be openly denounced by
leading intellectuals. . .as a dead weight on the mind of
the nation. lora
And as the lie died, the fear began to shift.
Strikes and demonstrations throughout the country,
especially after 19S8, served as another watershed -for the
shifting of fear away from the people. The Soviet
government found itself making unwanted concessions to
striking miners throughout the country in ever increasing
numbers. Large demonstrations took place around the USSR,
as people learned that not only could they openly protest
without being arrested, but their cause, which was often
nationalism, would even receive media coverage.
The effect that media coverage had on the people was
very important. The First USSR Congress of People's
Deputies <CPD) that met in May-June 1989 was not going to
be televised live until Yeltsin and other liberal reformers
forced the issue. The reformers felt that, without
television coverage, the Congress would be void of debate
and turn into a ceremonial event. 10 'y Because of the
television coverage, this was definitely not the case.
John Stuart Mill taught that one of the crucial roles
of any legislative assembly was to inform the public and
stimulate political debate. This the CCPDH achieved with
a vengeance. Operating with greater glasnost than the
British House of Commons, it allowed its proceedings to be
televised live. The Soviet people were transfixed in
front of their television sets, watching the spectacle of
their 1 i ves. l lo
The effect of the Congress on the people was notable.
Anatoly Sobchak, the mayor of Leningrad, stated that: "The
political awareness of people changed more in three weeks
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than in the preceding fifty years." XJ1 Yeltsin echoed
this sentiment: "On the day the Congress opened, they were
one sort of people; on the day that it closed they were
different people." xx - Perhaps Martin Malia summed it up
best: "Fear of state authority had almost vanished during
the summer after the Congress, and with it, so it seemed,
the regime's ability to govern." x x 3
Another milestone event in the shift of fear was the
Moscow demonstration on 28 March 1991. The demonstration
was outlawed by Prime Minister Pavlov. Other future members
of the GKChP spoke out, warning the people not to
participate. xx * Gorbachev even issued a presidential
decree that removed the Moscow militia from the control of
the RSFSR and placed it under the USSR MVD. Yet at least
100,000 Russians defied the ban and the 50,000 troops that
had been assembled, to peacefully march through Moscow in
support of Yeltsin and Russian nationalism. I z ves t i ya
called the government's actions "disgraceful," stating that
the authorities were demonstrating "power 1 essness , fear
before their own people, an inability and even unwillingness
to talk with them." 11S5
As the fear shifted and the public became more
mobilized, Boris Yeltsin solidified his role as leader of
the opposition. Yeltsin's leadership was legitimized
following his election as the RSFSR President on 12 June,
making him the first democratically elected leader in all of
Russian history. And when the coup began, Yeltsin wore his
mantel of legitimacy very well. The GKChP had no such
mantel to wear, even though the committee tried hard to
appear constitutional. This concern shown by the GKChP over
its legality is another indicator of how much the Soviet
Union had changed. The GKChP seemed generally concerned
that its actions appear legal, not just within the country,
but to the West as well. Until this time, any change of
leadership within the Soviet Union was made with a
noticeable lack of concern -for Western and domestic
percept i ons.
An interesting note about Yeltsin's use of his
legitimacy is that during the coup, Yeltsin never issued
orders concerning the USSR, but only the RSFSR. Yeltsin
continually called for Gorbachev's reinstatement, and he
qualified many of his decrees, stating that they were only
in effect until the USSR's constitutional order was
restored. 11A This was an attempt by Yeltsin not to appear
to be replacing Gorbachev, for that is what the GKChP was
attempting. Yeltsin also received support from Western
leaders, most notably President Bush. The two leaders spoke
together daily after the coup started. Yeltsin reportedly
stated that "he wasn't sure what his fate would be but he
desperately needed continued public support from
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Bush." 11V Bush's telephone diplomacy continued throughout
the coup, and it has been recently been revealed that the US
President even called Gorbachev sometime in June to
personally warn him that, according to US intelligence
sources, a hard-line coup was imminent. 11Q
In retrospect, the actions of the SKChP in August were
condemned to fail for a multitude of reasons. The lie of
communism was dead, and even the GKChP seemed to realize
this: at no time, in any of their decrees or at their press
conference, did the GKChP mention Marxism-Leninism,
communism, or socialism. x 'L 'y These men called themselves
conservatives, yet there was no ideology for them to
conserve. All the GKChP desired was to preserve their
privileges. The lack of ruthlessness with which the
committee dealt with the media and the military prevented a
return to the terror which was needed to control the people
and destroy the nationalism movement. And without the
terror, the people were free of fear. A significant portion
of the people of the Soviet Union resisted the coup, and,
for at least 72 hours, resisted their alleged historical




In a recently published biography of Boris Yeltsin,
Reuters correspondent John Morrison made the analogy that
the Soviet coup was similar to the explosion o-f the nuclear
reactor at Chernobyl—both events were inevitable, yet
avoi dabl e.
Just as Chernobyl was the inevitable product o-f a
nuclear system that ignored worldwide safety standards,
the coup was also a disaster waiting to happen. It was
the meltdown of a system that was not designed to
withstand the stresses and strains of the democratic
re-forms to which Gorbachev had subjected it.
But it was a coup that could have been prevented. Like
the operators in the control room at Chernobyl, who
ignored the warning lights that -flashed at them and the
dials pointing to red, Gorbachev failed to spot the signs
of approaching disaster. Gorbachev ignored warnings from
Eduard Shevardnadze and Alexander Yakovlev, previously his
fellow-architects of reform, that hard-liners were
preparing a return to the old ways. 1=°
Gorbachev repeatedly ignored warnings due to his
confidence in his ability to skirt disaster. Gorbachev's
place in history is secure, if for no other reason than
bringing about the massive changes in Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union. This change was made possible due to
Gorbachev's skill as a master politician. During the course
of one year, from August 1990 to August 1991, Gorbachev
moved back and forth between various political factions with
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supreme skill. The swing to the right that occurred in the
Fall and Winter of 1990-1991 was, to a certain extent,
forced on Gorbachev by the conservatives. Yet Gorbachev
seemed to think that he could use this to his advantage.
Gorbachev wanted to have it all—he wanted reform, yet he
also wanted to be able to save the empire. To stay in power
in order to meet his dual goals, Gorbachev had to avoid a
general election to the post of President of the USSR, for
he conceivably would have lost his post. By appointing
conservatives to key positions, Gorbachev was able to retain
his powers throughout the winter. Then, in the spring, the
Union Treaty was renegotiated, and Gorbachev resumed his
position as the leader of reforms. Gorbachev knew that this
would not be acceptable to the conservatives, and it can be
assumed that he expected them to lash out at him.
The expected backlash occurred on 17-21 June, when the
conservatives took action in the Supreme Soviet to transfer
powers from Gorbachev to Prime Minister Pavlov. Support was
given to Pavlov by KGB Chief Kryuchkov, Defense Minister
Yazov, and Interior Minister Pugo. The Soyuz coalition of
People's Deputies also supported this attempt to usurp
Gorbachev's power. This legislative putsch failed only
after Gorbachev made an emotional speech to the assembly,
stating that the conservatives were "completely divorced
from reality." 1 - 1 Gorbachev later stated that he did not
fear the hardliners, and that "society will reject
63
them." x ~'' The most revealing quote of the entire a-f-fair
was spoken outside the assembly hall after the movement by
the conservatives was defeated. Gorbachev met with
reporters, surrounded by Yazov, Pugo, and Kryuchkov.
Appearing relieved and happy, Gorbachev announced that:
"the coup is over." 1 -3 Gorbachev seemed to think, that he
had finally defeated the conservatives. With supreme
confidence, Gorbachev felt that the way was clear to
continue reforms and to get the Union Treaty signed in
August. This error in judgment was perhaps the biggest
mistake of Gorbachev's political career. So sure of his
defeat of the conservatives, Gorbachev did not relieve any
of them from their duties for attempting the constitutional
coup. Gorbachev's overconf i dence allowed him to ignore the
warning signals of the August coup, much like the operators
at Chernobyl. The August coup and its aftermath did not
just destroy Gorbachev's overconf i dence , it destroyed his
empi re.
The causes of failure for the GKChP should serve as a
lesson for possible future attempts to seize power in any of
the republics. The GKChP failed because they had nothing
with which they could motivate the people. The strongest
ideology in the Soviet Union today is nationalism, and the
GKChP had no means of exploiting this attitude. The GKChP
was motivated to attempt to save the empire, as well as to
control the economy and enforce law and order within the
64
country. The empire has now crumbled, yet the economic and
discipline problems remain. The possibility of a future
attempt to rule with an iron fist should not be taken
lightly.
A prominent Russian legal scholar has commented that
the people of the Soviet Union "suffered victory" in the
August coup. i:a 'a The near term future of the former Soviet
Union is full of potentially disastrous questions. What
will be done about the economy and market reforms? What
about housing and pay for the Armed Forces, which i s an
organization that must be kept satisfied to avoid
confrontation? Will there be food riots? What will happen
to the estimated 25 million Russians who live outside the
RSFSR? These and many other questions are unanswerable at
this time. Yet it is erroneous to state that the people
suffered victory. What the people suffered was years of
totalitarian rule. The victory that the people earned was a
rejection of an attempt to return to totalitarianism. What
the people do with this victory remains to be seen. As the
Greek historian Polybius said over 2,000 years ago: "Those
who know how to win are much more numerous that those who
know how to make proper use of their victories." t=ss The
challenge to the citizens of the former USSR is to find
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Some information wa s gath ered f r om a large packet of
material that I received from an i nd ividua 1 that was in
Moscow at the t i me of t
h
e coup Inc 1 uded in this pack et are
various orders . and decrees tha t were si gne d by Yel tsi n and
reproduced to be handed out i n the street
s
of Moscow. In
addi t i on , the packet con tai ns copi es of th e emergency i ssues
of various net*ispapers th at were outl awed b y the BKChP, yet
were pr i nted
,
photocopi e d , and di str i buted from person to
person. I obt ained the packet wi th the assistance of Mrs.
Natalie Marchenko-Fryber ger of the Def ense Language
Inst i tute.
Additional information was obtained from video taped
interviews with Colonel Viktor Alksnis on the Mac Nei 1 /Lehrer
News Hour on 16 and 24 July 1991, and the Cable News
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